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Abstract:  
This article considers the right to data protection under EU law and examines a range conceptual and 
practical difficulties with which it is besieged. Particularly, the article engages with questions regarding 
whether the right to data protection as contained in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights confers on 
individuals proprietary or personal interests in their personal data. The article considers prominent 
arguments on either side of this debate and argues that there are notable flaws inherent in both. The 
article goes on to tentatively argue that rather than providing individuals with proprietary or personal 
interests in their personal data, the EU data protection framework perhaps confers upon them a different 
form of right entirely. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
Since the mid-twentieth century, data, and perhaps especially personal data,1 have become increasingly 
valuable and ubiquitous in commerce and industry worldwide. Whilst human interaction has always 
involved the processing of personal data in one form or another, in our current “Information Society” 
the processing of personal data is now more important, and the consequences more far-reaching, than 
at any other point in history. A rapidly-growing market now exists in which personal data are traded 
and employed as the basis for marketing and control strategies. Much of the “Internet Economy”, for 
instance, is fuelled by individuals exchanging their personal data, either actively or passively, in 
exchange for the use of online services and applications. Concurrently, public sector organisations and 
government agencies are also increasingly reliant on the processing of personal data.  
Alongside the digitisation of society data protection law has assumed an increasingly critical role in our 
everyday lives, regulating everything from legal responsibility for cyber-security breaches to how social 
media platforms store and share information regarding their users. In an attempt to keep astride the 
various regulatory challenges posed by the rapid pace of technological change the EU data protection 
framework has granted EU citizens an increasing range of rights in relation to their personal data. 
Against this background a debate has emerged in respect of whether these rights grant individuals 
proprietary interests in their personal data (i.e. property rights) or, alternatively, if it instead grants them 
the lesser ability to exercise control over those personal data in certain contexts (i.e. personality rights). 
The purpose of the article is to provide an overview of this increasingly salient debate, highlight some 
of the conceptual and practical limitations of the arguments on both sides, and lay some preliminary 
foundations in respect of how the nature of the right to data protection might further be explored. To 
this end, the article comprises of five substantive sections.  
The first section examines the concept of rights as a fixture in the European legal tradition. Here it is 
explained how rights can be identified and delineated from other forms of legal relationships. The 
second section considers two categories of rights that are prominent in European legal order: personality 
rights and property rights. Here the article explains what distinguishes one from the other, and why it 
is they can be categorised as “rights”. The third section briefly outlines the emergence of data protection 
law in Europe and introduces the right to data protection as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union. Section four considers how there has been considerable confusion as to 
the delineation and categorisation of the right to data protection, particularly in respect of whether rights 
granted under the European data protection framework can be said to provide individuals with 
proprietary or personal interests in their personal data. Here the article highlights how the cogency of 
various positions taken on both sides of this debate is somewhat dubious. In its fifth and final substantive 
section the article considers how the rights granted by EU data protection law are potentially neither 
property rights nor personality rights, but another form of right entirely. Particularly, it is examined 
whether data protection rights under EU law might possibly be categorised as so-called “quasi-property 
rights”, a legal mechanism that is typically found in the jurisprudence of the courts of the USA. The 
article concludes with a summation of its analyses and some thoughts as to where future research would 
be beneficial.  
1. Rights 
The word “right” has multiple meanings in legal scholarship and discourse, with many being so 
entrenched in both ordinary and technical uses that it has been suggested that the best one can hope for 
is to keep the different meanings of the term distinct, and to see to it that these distinctions are 
                                                          
1 In accordance with the definition of personal data contained within the General Data Protection Regulation, 
this article uses the term “personal data” to refer to “any information relating to an identified or identifiable 
natural person”. See: Art.4(1) General Data Protection Regulation.  
consistently attended to.2 It is a word that tends to be used indiscriminately and utilised to refer to any 
sort of legal advantage to which an individual is entitled. It has, however, long been recognised that 
such opacity in legal language can act as a considerable impediment to the clarity of legal analyses.3  
When legal scholars speak of rights they, generally speaking, appear to refer to the existence of a state 
of affairs in which one party (the party in possession of a right), has a claim on an act or forbearance of 
another party (the party against whom the right can be enforced) in the sense that, should the claim be 
exercised or in force, and the act or forbearance not be done, it would be justifiable in the circumstances 
to use coercive measures to extract either the performance required or compensation in lieu of that 
performance.4 Whilst this might initially seem straightforward, if one is to look at most familiar rights 
with a degree of analytical rigour, it quickly becomes evident that they possess a complex internal 
structure.  
According to the American legal theorist Wesley Hohfeld, for instance, all rights necessarily consist of 
an arrangement of four basic components. Named after Hohfeld himself, the four core components of 
which all rights are made up, colloquially known as the “Hohfeldian Incidents”, are liberties, claims, 
powers and immunities. Each of these components has a distinct logical form, and can constitute a right 
when viewed in isolation, but they can also overlap and bond together to form rights of a more complex 
nature.5 In this context, the term “liberty” refers to the ability of the right holder to abstain from acting 
in a certain way. “Claim” refers to the ability of the right holder to be protected from interference from 
another, or protected from another interfering with something with which they are involved. “Power” 
refers to the ability of the right holder to initiate changes to their liberties and claims, and “immunity” 
refers to the ability of the right holder to not have the status of their liberties or claims altered by others 
without consent.6 Though there have been scholarly disagreements about some of its details, and some 
contentions as to its usefulness more generally,7 Hohfeld’s system for describing the structure of rights, 
first articulated in 1913, is now widely accepted and is thought to be an effective way by which the 
composition of all rights can be explained.8  
To fully appreciate the true and precise meaning of an assertion of any right, it is critical that we 
understand how said right is constructed and what said right purports to do. If this is not possible then 
not only will any analysis and investigation of that right be impeded, but questions will be raised in 
respect of that right’s normative value. A right that lacks clarity in terms of its structure, function and 
purpose for instance, will likely be difficult to apply practically and enforce. As has been convincingly 
argued elsewhere, for instance, vagueness and the absence of clarity within the law often have profound 
impacts on meaning that bear heavily on judicial interpretation.9 Accordingly, against this background, 
Hohfeld’s authoritative methodology is extremely useful when it comes to answering questions relating 
                                                          
2 L Becker, Property Rights: Philosophic Foundations (Routledge 2014) 
3 See, for example: J Thayer, A preliminary treatise on evidence at the common law (Little, Brown and 
Company 1898) 
4 Ibid 
5 W Hohfeld, 'Some Fundamental Legal Concepts as Applied in Judicial Reasoning' [1913] 23(1) Yale Law 
Journal 
6 Ibid 
7 See, for example: C Newman, Hohfeld and the Theory of in Rem Rights: An Attempted Mediation. in 
Balganesh and others (eds), The Legacy of Wesley Hohfeld: Edited Major Works, Select Personal Papers and 
Original Commentaries (Cambridge University Press 2017) 
8 D MacCormick, Rights in Legislation. in P Hacker and J Raz (eds), Law Morality and Society (Oxford 
University Press 1977). Other notable theorists, such as Dworkin, have sought to explain rights in terms of their 
value. See: M Andrews, 'Hohfeld's Cube' [1983] 16(3) Akron Law Review 
9 See, for instance: S Schiffer, Philosophical and Jurisprudential Issues of Vagueness. in G Keil and R Poscher 
(eds), Vagueness and Law: Philosophical and Legal Perspectives (Oxford University Press 2016) 23-48 
 
to whether an individual can be said to enjoy a genuine “right” in a given situation, or if they are merely 
bestowed with some other form of legal advantage.  
Being able to categorically state that an individual enjoys a “right”, as opposed to another form of legal 
advantage, however, will not necessarily be where the complications regarding conceptual clarity end. 
Whilst it certainly appears to be true to say that all rights are inevitably made up of Hohfeldian liberties, 
claims, powers and immunities, questions as to the nature and precise function of a right’s constituent 
liberties, claims, powers and immunities will still require address if the true extent of that right’s nature 
is to be fully understood. 
2. Property Rights and Personality Rights 
In modern civil law it has been suggested that there are two clear cut notions of rights.10 Public law 
recognises fundamental rights, such as traditional human rights and social and economic rights. Private 
law, conversely, provides an array of subjective rights, notably property rights in physical objects and 
resources. Personality rights, another important concept in contemporary civil law, do not fit neatly into 
this dichotomy, and instead function as so-called “private human rights”, as a metaphor for non-physical 
aspects of an individual’s persona. As is examined below, whether rights enjoyed by individuals under 
EU data protection law can be categorised as property rights or personality rights is a contentious matter 
and has become hotly contested. To contextualise the examination of that debate, it is important to first 
outline the key identifying characteristics of property rights and personality rights, and how they 
qualitatively and substantively differ from one another. 
2.1 Property Rights 
Property rights grant their holder the exclusive authority to determine how a resource, item, or object is 
used. In other words, to have a property right in a thing is to have a bundle of Hohfeldian incidents that 
effectively grant ownership or sovereignty in respect of said thing. For instance, an individual who has 
an absolute property right in an area of land has the sovereignty to determine whether to use the land 
themselves, destroy the land, make modifications to the land, or to abandon the land.11 In this respect, 
it is important to note that property rights confer upon their holder an entitlement to deliberately act in 
a way that may be harmful to themselves or their own interests.12  
In addition to conferring the capacity to determine the use of a resource, however, property rights have 
two other main attributes. The first is that they grant their holder the right to the services of a resource. 
For instance, if the rights holder mentioned above were to to lease their area of land to another party 
they would also have the right to claim all relevant rental income. The second is that having property 
rights in a resource or object allows the rights holder to delegate, lease, sell, or gift any portion of their 
rights to another on whatever basis the rights holder determines. In other words, such rights are 
alienable.  
The three key characteristics of property rights, therefore, are that they allow their holder exclusivity in 
respect of choosing how a resource is used, exclusivity to the services of that resource, and the ability 
to exchange that resource, object, or item with others on terms that they find agreeable.13 In other words, 
                                                          
10 G Bruggemeier, Personality Rights in European Tort Law (Cambridge University Press 2010) 
11 L Becker, The Moral Basis of Property Rights. in R Pennock and J Chapman (eds), Nomos XXII: Property 
(New York University Press 1980) 187-220; P Eleftheriadis, 'The Analysis of Property Rights' [1996] 16(1) 
Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 31-54 
12 H Demsetz, Towards a Theory of Property Rights. in C Gopalakrishnan (ed), Classic Papers in Natural 
Resource Economics (Palgrave Macmillan 2000) 163-177  
13 H Hansmann and R Kraakman, 'Property, Contract and Verification: The Numerous Clausus Problem and the 
Divisibility of Right' [2002] 31(2) Journal of Legal Studies 373-420 
the crux of the notion of property rights is that they allow their holder to exclude others from accessing 
or making use of the resource or commodity to which the right pertains.14 
From this we can ascertain that property rights can be identified as genuine “rights” according to the 
Hohfeldian methodology as they will typically be made up of a bundle of Hohfeldian incidents. The 
holder of a complete property right in a piece of land as considered above, for instance, will have a 
liberty to use their land as they see fit subject to any duties not to use their land in a certain way, a claim 
to exclude others from entering the land, a power to transfer ownership of the land or create an easement 
and, an immunity from others telling them how to use their land. Simultaneously, other parties may also 
have an immunity to fly over the land or possibly to observe the land from an external standpoint.     
2.2 Personality rights 
As seen above, property rights focus on the control of resources, items and objects. Contra to the 
property rights doctrine, however, personality rights focus on the control of aspects of an individual’s 
being and identity, rather than any material objects, possessions, or land.15 In other words, they are 
rights which recognise an individual as a physical, spiritual and moral being, and aim to guarantee and 
preserve that individual’s sense of their own existence.  
The doctrine of personality rights is far from new. Natural law, with its notion of innate, and inalienable 
human rights, which included various rights relating to personality, forms the background to concept as 
it is widely understood today.16 In the 1970s, various scholars postulated the idea of a general right to 
personality, from which particular rights or interests of personality might develop, such as rights to 
physical integrity, freedom and dignity.17 Some, such as Gierke, enumerated the key characteristics 
which distinguish personality rights from other forms of rights, arguing that personality rights are 
private rights of a non-patrimonial nature, are highly personal in the sense that they are connected to 
the personality of their holder, and terminate upon the death of the holder, rendering them non-
transferable and non-hereditary.18  
The idea of personality rights existing as a distinct category of rights is now firmly established 
throughout Europe, though there is some divergence between different legal systems in terms of the 
recognition and scope of protection of such rights.19 Despite this divergence, however, it is clear they 
enjoy widespread recognition, with many European legal systems either acknowledging such rights by 
statute or through the courts. These rights inter alia include: the rights to life, physical integrity, bodily 
freedom, reputation, dignity, identity, and, as is examined below, potentially privacy and data 
protection.20 As noted above, the key distinguishing feature of personality rights is that they are a form 
of rights that are intrinsically linked to fundamental components and aspects of an individual’s 
character, allow individuals to control certain aspects of their personality, as opposed to their property, 
                                                          
14 See, for example: J Penner, The Idea of Property in Law (Oxford University Press 1997) 71; S Balganesh, 
'Demystifying the Right to Exclude: Of Property, Inviolability, and Automatic Injunctions' [2008] 31(2) Harvard 
Journal of Law & Public Policy 593; T Merrill, 'Property and the Right to Exclude' [1998] 77(4) Nebraska Law 
Review 730 
15 A Popovici, ‘Personality Rights – A Civil Law Concept” [2004] 50 Loyola Law Review 349 
16 J Neethling, “Personality rights: a comparative overview” [2005] 38(2) The Comparative and International 
Law Journal of Southern Africa 210-245 
17K Gareis, “Das juristische Wesen der Autorrechte, sowie des Firmen-und Markenschitzes” [1877] cited in J 
Neethling [2005], Ibid. 
18 Gierke, O. (1895) Deutches Privatrecht, cited in J Neethling [2005] (n.16) 
19 In the United Kingdom, for instance, personality rights are almost formally non-existent, with many being 
protected incidentally through torts such as breach of confidence and defamation.  
20 W Moddelmog, “Disowning “Personality”: Privacy and Subjectivity in the House of Mirth” [1998] 70(2) 
American Literature 337-363. 
and, as a corollary, prevent components and aspects of their personality from being compromised or 
misused by others.  
From this we can ascertain that personality rights, like property rights, can be identified as rights in 
accordance with the Hohfeldian methodology as they will typically consist of a bundle of Hohfeldian 
incidents. The holder of a personality right, for instance, may have a liberty to behave or utilise aspects 
of their identity as they see fit, a claim to exclude others from utilising aspects of their identity, a power 
to allow others to utilise aspects of their identity, and an immunity from others dictating to them how 
to behave or utilise aspects of their identity.  
2.3 Distinguishing property rights and personality rights 
By considering each in turn we can see that both property rights and personality rights can be identified 
as rights within the scope of Hohfeldian analysis as both will likely have a combination of Hohfeldian 
incidents at their core. It can also be argued that both forms of rights also share some similarities in 
terms of their theoretical underpinnings and rationale. Various observers have suggested, for instance, 
that the ultimate purpose of both property rights and personality rights is to ensure economic efficiency, 
to protect civil liberties, and to protect individuals from other parties making unjust interferences in 
their lives.21 
However, despite these similarities, we can also discern that property rights and personality rights are 
qualitatively and conceptually distinct. Property rights are, as noted above, concerned with allowing 
individuals to assert their ownership or sovereignty over specific resources, items or objects. Whilst 
both property rights and personality rights may have the ultimate objective of protecting individuals 
from unjust interferences in their lives, the doctrine of property rights does so by way of attempting to 
secure an individual’s legal interests in external things to which the individual can assert a connection. 
They are rights that tend to be infringed when the rights holder experiences some form of interference 
in their enjoyment of the external thing to which their right relates, or when that thing experiences some 
form of pecuniary damage or harm. Such rights are also alienable and transferable. Accordingly, they 
are a form of rights which exist independently of an individual’s personality.  
The same, however, cannot be said for personality rights. The doctrine of personality rights attempts to 
shield individuals from unjust interferences in their lives through attempting to identify fundamental 
innate aspects of their personhood and expressing them as legal values. They are rights that come into 
being when an individual is born, cease to exist when the individual dies, cannot exist independently of 
an individual’s personality, and are thus inalienable and non-transferable. The infringement of such 
rights primarily results in personality harm, non-pecuniary loss or damage, which is any damage of, or 
diminution to, an aspect of an individual’s personality rather than a diminution in the individual’s 
patrimony, and therefore cannot be calculated in money by way of reference to a market value.  
3. Historical background data protection as a legal concept: the emergence of the right to 
data protection 
Thus far, this article has considered the different criteria that can be used to identify the existence of a 
right and, pursuant of this, outlined the key features and characteristics that can be used to identify two 
important categories of rights: property rights and personality rights. What is significant for the 
purposes of this article’s central argument, however, is that whilst property rights and personality rights 
can, on paper at least, be clearly delineated, in practice issues can arise in respect of which of these two 
categories certain rights or bundles of rights fall within. One subject area in which this is particularly 
                                                          
21 C Walsh, “The justifications underlying personality rights” [2013] 24(1) Entertainment Law Review;  
P Samuelson, “Privacy as Intellectual Property?” [1999] 52 Stanford Law Review; J Neethling (n.16); L Becker 
(n.1); L Becker (n.11). 
true, and one that comprises the focus of this article, are rights pertaining to an individual’s personal 
data.  
Data protection as a specific field of law has developed over the last forty years at a European level, 
notably in the context of the Council of Europe and, more recently, in the context of the European 
Union. If we are to examine how the EU has continued on the basis of the work done earlier by the 
Council of Europe two prominent themes can plainly be identified. The first relates to the development 
of ever stronger privacy and data protection rights. The second relates to the need to ensure a more 
consistent and clearly delineated application of those rights across EU Member States.22 Significantly, 
in relation to the development of both themes, recent history has demonstrated the increasing impact of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, particularly in relation to the case law of the 
Court of Justice.23  
The concept of a right to privacy emerged in international law after the conclusion of the Second World 
War. The first notable example of this was Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
according to which nobody shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with their privacy, family, home 
or correspondence.24 A more substantive protection followed in Article 8 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights,25 according to which everyone has the right to respect for their private and family 
life, their home and their correspondence.26 The scope of this protection has been articulated at length 
by the European Court of Human Rights27 in a series of high profile judgments. In cases concerning the 
protection and interpretation of the right to privacy the court will consider whether there has been an 
interference with the right to respect for a private life and, if so, whether that interference has an 
adequate legal basis.  
Despite the ECtHR having made several high-profile judgments affirming the importance of the right 
to a private and family life, in the 1970s the Council of Europe concluded that Article 8 ECHR had 
several observable shortcomings. Particularly, there were notable concerns that the right to privacy, as 
envisaged by the ECHR, was not flexible enough to adequately protect individuals from harms and 
abuses stemming from the misuse of personal information linked to the computerised processing of data 
that was becoming increasingly prevalent in both public and private sectors.28 These concerns 
culminated in the Council of Europe adopting the Data Protection Convention in 1981, also known as 
Convention 108, the purpose of which was to secure individuals’ fundamental rights and fundamental 
freedoms, but particularly the right to privacy, in relation to the automatic processing of their personal 
data.29 At this point it is important to note that the approach of the Convention was not that the 
processing of personal data would always amount to an interference with the right to privacy as per 
Article 8 ECHR, but that for the protection of privacy and other fundamental legal rights and freedoms 
any processing of personal data must observe certain legal conditions.30  
Despite Convention 108 putting data protection on the agenda, due to inconsistencies in its 
implementation across Member States, the European Commission, concerned that this lack of 
                                                          
22 P Hustinx, 'EU Data Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed Data 
Protection Regulation' [2014] European Data Protection Supervisor 
23 [hereinafter CJEU] 
24 Article 12 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
25 [hereinafter ECHR] 
26 Article 8 ECHR.  
27 [hereinafter ECtHR] 
28 L Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International Perspective (Oxford University Press 2014); P Hustinx, The 
Reform of EU Data Protection. in Witzleb and others (eds), Emerging Challenges in Privacy Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2014) 62-71 
29 Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, January 
1981, CETS no.108. 
30 P Hustinx, (n.22) 
harmonisation may hamper the development of the internal market, submitted a proposal for a Data 
Protection Directive in 1990. After several years of negotiations, the Data Protection Directive was 
adopted in 1995 and required all EU Member States to protect the fundamental rights and freedoms of 
natural persons, particularly the right to privacy, with respect to the processing of personal data.31 The 
Directive contains all the principles contained within Convention 108, but supplements them with 
additional rules and provisions. The Directive’s lifespan, like the Convention before it, however, has 
been troubled and wrought with complication. Not only have problems relating to divergences in 
application between Member States persisted, but technological advancements, such as the emergence 
of new data mining and analytical technologies associated with the emergence of so-called “big data”, 
have called into question the efficacy of several of the Directive’s core tenets.32  
To address some of these concerns the imminent General Data Protection Regulation will replace the 
Directive and will come into force May 2018.33 The GDPR is premised on the same principles and 
rationale as the Convention and Directive before it, but aims to overhaul the existing European data 
protection regime and has been drafted specifically to respond to the challenges posed by contemporary 
data-handling practices. Significantly in this regard, the GDPR contains various novel provisions 
designed to help individuals to protect themselves from harms that may stem from the processing of 
their personal data, and to put them in a position from which they can more easily and effectively control 
how their personal data are used by others.34 Perhaps the most prominent example of this is the much 
talked about right to be forgotten.35 
 
What this brief overview of the development of data protection law in Europe shows is that out of the 
apparent shortcomings of Article 8 ECHR, data protection has emerged as distinct and extensive body 
of law at the European level. However, alongside the abovementioned legislative developments of the 
last few decades, other key developments were taking place elsewhere. Significantly, in June 1999 the 
                                                          
31 Directive 95/46/EC on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the 
free movement of such data [hereinafter, the Data Protection Directive] 
32 See, for example: H Pearce, 'Big Data and the Reform of the European Data Protection Framework: An 
Overview of Potential Concerns Associated with Proposals for Risk Management-based Approaches to the 
Concept of Personal Data' [2017] 26(3) Information & Communications Technology Law 312-335; H Pearce, 
'Systems thinking, big data and data protection law: Using Ackoff’s Interactive Planning to respond to emergent 
policy challenges' [2016] 18(4) European Journal of Law Reform 475-504; P Ohm, 'Broken Promises of 
Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of Anonymization' [2010] 57 UCLA Law Review 1707; L 
Colana, 'Mo’ Data, Mo’ Problems? Personal Data Mining and the Challenge to the Data Minimization Principle' 
[2013] The Future of Privacy Forum and Stanford Law School Center for Internet & Society; V Mayer-
Schonberger and K Cukier, Big Data: A Revolution That Will Transform How We Live, Work and Think (John 
Murray Publishers 2013) 
33 Officially known as Regulation (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the 
processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC [EU Data 
Protection Law: The Review of Directive 95/46/EC and the Proposed Data Protection Regulation hereinafter 
GDPR] 
34 For a discussion on the conceptual difficulties associated with the notion of individual control of personal data 
as envisaged by the European data protection framework, see: H Pearce, 'Could the doctrine of moral rights be 
used as a basis for understanding the notion of control within data protection law?' [2018] 27(2) Information & 
Communications Technology Law 
35 In short, the right to be forgotten entitles bestows upon data subjects the right to acquire the deletion of any 
personal data held by a third party, and is enshrined in Article 17 of the GDPR. For various reasons it has, 
however, been a source of controversy with various observers highlighting a range of concerns in respect of its 
nomenclature and possible consequences of its enforcement. See, for instance: B Koops, 'Forgetting Footprints, 
Shunning Shadows: A Critical Analysis of the ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ in Big Data Practice' [2011] 8(3) 
SCRIPTed; J Ausloos, 'The ‘Right to Be Forgotten’ – Worth Remembering?' [2011] 28(2) Computer Law & 
Security Review 
European Council began drafting the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, eventually 
culminating in the Charter’s proclamation at the European Summit in Nice in December 2000.36  
Since the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty37 in 2009 the Charter has been binding on EU Member 
States and has the same legal status as other EU treaties. For the purposes of this article, one of the most 
significant elements of the Charter is the way in which it explicitly recognises separate rights to privacy 
and data protection. Article 7 of the Charter mirrors the wording of Article 8 ECHR and states that 
“everyone has the right to respect for his or her private and family life, home and communications”. 
Following this, Article 8 of the Charter states that “everyone has the right to the protection of personal 
data concerning him or her”. The inclusion of a right to data protection alongside the right to privacy 
formally differentiates the Charter from other key European human rights instruments, which tend to 
treat data protection as the subset of privacy.38  
According to the Charter’s explanatory notes, the right to privacy guaranteed in Article 7 of the Charter 
corresponds to that guaranteed by Article 8 ECHR.39 Both are examples of so-called “classical” 
fundamental rights, where interference with those rights is subject to strict qualifications. The 
explanatory notes also pass comment on Article 8 of the Charter, outlining the fact that it is based on 
Article 286 EC Treaty, the Data Protection Directive, Article 8 ECHR and the Data Protection 
Convention. It is further specified that the right to protection of personal data is to be exercised under 
the conditions laid down in the Directive.40 As they are mentioned as two separate rights, it would seem 
logical to conclude that that Articles 7 and 8 of the Charter do not have the same character and must be 
considered independent and distinct from one another.  
Even though they are listed separately, however, it is sometimes debated whether the two rights can 
categorically be considered conceptually distinct or, instead, the right to data protection exists both 
theoretically and practically as a subset or relation of the right to privacy.41 This is an issue that has now 
been well-traversed in the data protection literature, and for this reason it is not necessary, nor would it 
be useful, to recount it in any detail here. As has been convincingly argued by others elsewhere, for 
                                                          
36 Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union OJ C 364, 18.12.2000. 
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38 For instance, data protection is treated as a subset to privacy by the national Constitutions of the Netherlands, 
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39 Explanations relating to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, document CONVENT 49 
of 11.10.2000, explanation on Article 7. 
40 Ibid., explanation on Article 8, footnote 75. 
41 See, for example: G Fuster and S Gutwirth, 'Opening up personal data protection: A conceptual controversy' 
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Infrastructures (Springer 2017) and Y McDermott, 'Conceptualising the right to data protection in an era of Big 
Data' [2017] 15(5) Big Data & Society. For a detailed overview of the relevant CJEU and ECHR case law, see: 
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instance, notably Lynskey, there are an array of compelling reasons as to why the right to data protection 
can be considered as completely distinct to the right privacy, and a fully-fledged right of its own.42  
However, whilst the right to data protection can be considered conceptually distinct from other related 
rights, like privacy rights, there are unanswered question as to the nature of the right to data protection. 
Specifically, there is confusion as to whether the right to data protection as contained within Article 8 
of the Charter, along with the range of rights conferred on individual data subjects by various pieces of 
secondary EU legislation, confers upon individuals proprietary or personal interests in their personal 
data.  
4. Data protection rights: property rights or personality rights?  
As alluded to above there is disagreement between various observers as to whether the rights granted 
to individuals by EU data protection legislation can be considered to confer upon their holder personal 
or proprietary interests in their personal data. This is true not just in respect of whether a data subject’s 
personal data should be thought of in terms or property or personality, but whether the law, as it is, 
objectively treats them as one or the other.43 
4.1 Scholarly perspectives on whether data protection should be conceptualised as a means of 
protecting proprietary or personal interests 
As outlined above, the doctrine of personality rights aims to provide individuals with a means by which 
they can control aspects of their character, personality or identity. Significantly, over the last one 
hundred or so years, the basis of various scholarly conceptualisations of privacy, and more recently data 
protection, have been couched in such language. Perhaps most famously Westin conceptualised privacy 
as the ability of the individual to control when, how, and to what extent information about them is 
communicated to other parties.44 The notion as privacy as a means by which an individual can control 
aspects of their personality differs, therefore, from other prominent conceptualisations of privacy, such 
as considering privacy to be a “right to be let alone”.45  
The crux of privacy and data protection as conceived in this way is the idea that the individual’s self-
determination and choices in respect of how aspects of their identity are used or handled by others 
should take precedence over other competing values and interests. In this sense, when envisaged this 
way, privacy and data protection can essentially be conceptualised as forms of information 
management, where control is achieved through the expression of an individual’s personal preferences. 
Theories of privacy and data protection as control of aspects of one’s personality therefore, rely on the 
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presumption that individuals are autonomous and rational beings, capable of determining for themselves 
whether and when they wish to disclose aspects of their personal data to others.46 
Alongside the notions of privacy and data protection as the ability for one to control aspects of one’s 
personality, other scholars have taken a divergent approach, and conceptualised the two in terms of 
property. A notable, and apparently growing, part of the scholarly literature pertaining to privacy and 
data protection, for instance, considers how the two notions should be conceptualised as the ability of 
individuals to “own” their personal data. According to such views, privacy and data protection can be 
likened to property rights in that they are concepts that are directly and intrinsically linked to the idea 
that individuals should be able to stake legal, or possibly equitable, ownership of their personal data. 
As has been remarked elsewhere, and in accordance with the discussion of property rights above, in this 
sense the concepts of privacy and data protection evoke ideas of absolute inviolable sovereignty over 
personal data which entail an exclusivity axiom that theoretically allows the owner of personal data to 
protect those data from unwanted uses, sharing, and alteration, and grant them full alienable rights to 
those data.47 Such views tend to be premised on the notion that all types of information are capable of 
constituting a form of property and therefore it must be possible for them to be owned. Though much 
of the academic scholarship in this vein has historically emanated from the USA,48 it is now a topic 
which, as is examined in greater detail below, is beginning to draw more attention from scholars within 
Europe.49   
The competing conceptions of privacy and data protection as personality and as property clearly share 
some similar assumptions. Both, for instance, are necessarily reliant on the premise that individuals are 
rational and autonomous beings capable of forming personal preferences and determining courses of 
action by which those preferences can be expressed. In other words, both are concerned with 
establishing individual control over personal data. Both conceptions, therefore, appear to be linked to 
individualism, a philosophical school of thought which emphasizes the moral worth of the individual at 
the expense of any competing interests of groups of individuals or the state.50 The two conceptions of 
privacy and data protection outlined above, for instance, bestow upon the individual the ability to define, 
unilaterally and independently, their relationships with others, effectively rendering the crux of privacy 
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and data protection as the ability of the individual to detach themselves from other individuals and 
society at large.  
However, despite any overlying similarities, these two conceptions are clearly anchored in different 
theoretical backgrounds. The idea of privacy and data protection as personality, for instance, relies on 
the presumption that an individual’s personal data intrinsically represents key constituent aspects of that 
individual’s character, and that said individual should be able to control those data so to maintain the 
integrity of their identity. Conversely, the idea of privacy and data protection as property is based on 
the presumption that an individual’s personal data, rather than being considered an intrinsic feature of 
their identity, can essentially be thought of as an external resource to which the individual is entitled to 
control due to their ownership of that resource. 
The debate as to whether privacy and data protection should be couched in terms of property or 
personality in the context of the European data protection framework is now seemingly gathering 
momentum. Notably, in the context of contemporary data-handling practices, it is increasingly being 
questioned whether traditional approaches to the regulation of data processing activities, such as human 
rights law and data protection law, offer an adequate level of protection to individuals as would a 
property rights system of regulation.51 Such debates tend to focus primarily on whether the explicit 
creation of a proprietary right in personal data would be too drastically out of line with continental 
European legal tradition for such a move to ever be successful.52 Others, recognising that the idea of 
individuals enjoy property rights in respect of their personal data has some attractive benefits, suggest 
in practical terms that such a regime could be unworkable.53 
Other notable concerns that are frequently espoused tend to focus on the fact that the creation of a 
property right in personal data would likely create fresh regulatory challenges relating to the emergence 
of personal data marketplaces. Particularly, some observers have remarked that the risk of a market 
failure in such markets would be so severe that any benefits to be accrued from the propertisation of 
personal data would be outweighed by the risk of potential harms.54 In a similar vein, it has also been 
argued that privacy and data protection are public goods, rather than private resources, and that granting 
absolute rights in personal data could prevent the imposition of restrictions on an individual’s use of 
their data, possibly to the detriment of others.55  
4.2 Does European data protection law protect proprietary or personal interests? 
Despite the existence of the abovementioned normative debates as to whether personal data should be 
categorised as property or as aspects of an individual’s personality, none of the ECHR, the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, EU data protection legislation, nor the jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR or the CJEU explicitly categorise the rights to privacy and data protection as one or other. 
Consequently, another strand of debate has emerged, which focuses not on whether personal data 
protection should be viewed through the lenses of property or personality, but whether existing legal 
frameworks, the absence of any formal demarcations notwithstanding, in effect do view them through 
either of these lenses.  
In this respect, it might be asked if the practical consequences of data protection rights are ultimately 
the same under both interpretations (i.e. they provide legal mechanisms by which individuals can assert 
influence and control, and restrict the use of their personal data by others), then does their categorisation 
                                                          
51 C Prins, (n.49)  
52 See: N Putova, 'Private Law Solutions in European Data Protection: Relationship to Privacy, and Waiver of 
Data Protection Rights' [2010] 28(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 179-198. See also: L Determann, 
'No One Owns Data' [2018] Hastings Law Journal 
53 P Bernal , Internet Privacy Rights: Rights to Protect Autonomy (Cambridge University Press 2014) 178 
54 P Schwartz, (n.48) 
55 Ibid 
really matter? For reasons alluded to in this article’s introductory sections, the answer to this question 
is plainly yes. Far from being an indulgent question, as noted above, for any legal right to be fully 
understood it is critical that its internal structure can be identified, and that the precise nature of that 
right can be stated with certainty. If this cannot be done the situation will be unsatisfactory for several 
reasons. Namely, if the conceptual foundations of a right cannot be identified and stated the resultant 
lack of conceptual clarity will likely severely impede any legal analyses of it. In turn, this will inevitably 
lead to problems in terms of its practical application and enforcement, and raise doubts as to its 
normative value. 
These concerns are perhaps particularly salient in the context of the right to data protection where, due 
to a lack of conceptual clarity, doubts have already been expressed in respect of its long-term future.56 
In this vein, there is widespread disagreement as to the character of the right to data protection, with 
some observers arguing that the EU data protection framework already constitutes a property-like 
regime in everything but name, whilst others argue that individuals only enjoy something akin to 
personality rights in respect of their personal data. As will be argued below, however, there are doubts 
as to cogency of both positions.  
4.2.1 Arguments that EU data protection law grants proprietary interests in personal data 
Perhaps the most significant driver of the growing body of opinion that the European data protection 
framework can be considered a property-like regime is the GDPR which, as noted above, contains 
several new provisions and rights which purport to allow individuals to control their personal data. The 
right to be forgotten and right to data portability are two of the most prominent examples of this.57 
Significantly, some have suggested that despite the GDPR prima facie being premised on human rights 
rhetoric and the fact that it employs no explicit property terminology, its substantive provisions function 
remarkably similarly to regulated property regimes.58 Victor, for instance, suggests that not only does 
the GDPR in effect create a regime in personal data in which a property entitlement belongs to the 
individual to whom any personal data relate, but that more specifically the GDPR appears to implicitly 
acknowledge that the concept of personal data itself has become akin to a commodity that is capable of 
changing hands and being traded.59 In particular, he suggests that three elements of the GDPR 
particularly lend themselves to a property-based conception of data protection.  
First, it can be argued that the various requirements imposed on data controllers by the GDPR are all 
predicated on the notion that the individual data subject maintains a default entitlement to their personal 
data. In particular, the GDPR lists a number of grounds by which the processing of an individual’s 
personal data can be rendered legitimate, one of which is the unambiguous consent of the individual.60 
Under these grounds the individual to whom the personal data relate must be informed that their data 
have been collected and that they have the prerogative to object to any uses of their personal data,61 or 
possibly to have those data erased.62 In this sense, it is argued that the GDPR is premised on the 
assumption that although personal data is a commodity that is capable of changing hands, the individual 
always retains the ultimate entitlement to their personal data. In other words, even if an individual 
imparts with their personal data, and the personal data enter the possession of a third party, the 
individual to whom those data relate retains the ultimate authority to determine how those data are used. 
                                                          
56 S Rodota, Data Protection as a Fundamental Right?. in Gutwirth and others (eds), Reinventing Data 
Protection? (Springer 2009) 
57 See: Arts 17 & 20 GDPR. 
58 N Purtova, (n.48); J Ausloos, (n.35) 
59 J Victor, 'The EU General Data Protection Regulation: Toward a Property Regime for Protecting Data 
Privacy' [2013] 123 Yale Law Journal 513 
60 Art.6(a) and Art.4(11) GDPR 
61 Arts. 13, 14 & 15 GDPR 
62 Art.17 GDPR 
The sovereignty to determine the use of a resource or commodity in such a way, Victor argues, is a 
habitually characteristic of regulated property regimes.63  
Second, not only does the GDPR establish the individual’s default entitlement to their personal data, 
but this default entitlement creates a burden that metaphorically runs with those data and has the effect 
of binding others.64 In other words, the rights to which the individual is entitled under the GDPR, such 
as the right to be forgotten, can be enforced not just against a party with which the individual initially 
shared their personal data, but against any other third parties who may have gained access to those data. 
This indicates that rather than perceiving data protection and its associated rights as attached to a 
specific person (i.e. a personality right), the GDPR grounds these rights in the individual’s personal 
data themselves, allowing them to function as a form of negative covenant. Again, this is a trait that can 
be described as “property-like”.65  
Third, the system of remedies established by the GDPR mirrors schemes traditionally used to protect 
proprietary interests. As noted previously, property rights protect an individual’s interest in a certain 
object or resource. Notably, an interest will be protected from an unwanted use or taking by another 
party, under the assumption that property can only legitimately change hands if the consent of the right 
holder is given. The interest of rights holders in this context tend to be protected by courts and 
legislatures by way of fines, punitive damages or injunctions. Correlatively, the GDPR provides a 
variety of avenues for individuals to enjoin a third party to erase their personal data, essentially 
enforcing the abovementioned default entitlement of the individual by “returning” the personal data to 
their ownership. Individuals are also able to “lodge a complaint” against third parties through their local 
“supervisory authority”, a body that has the power “to order the rectification, erasure or destruction” of 
data,66 and may also bring a direct action against a third party in local courts, which are empowered to 
enforce the provisions of the GDPR by way of granting compensation for any breach that can be 
established.67 Finally, in the event a third party who either negligently or intentionally ignores an 
individual’s attempts to exercise their rights under the GDPR may be subject to fines.68 
Recognising the fact that the GDPR envisages personal data as a commodity that is capable of changing 
hands and effectively being traded, others have built on Victor’s arguments, and have offered differing 
perspectives. Purtova, for instance, suggests that so long as personal data bear a high economic value, 
any attempt to portray such data as res nullius, or as nobody’s property, as the European data protection 
framework prima facie appears to do, would be to attempt to perpetuate a fallacy that cannot be 
reconciled with the practical realities of contemporary data-handling practices.69 Rather than accepting 
Victor’s argument that the default entitlement in personal data rests with the individual to whom those 
data relate, Purtova argues that the European data protection framework does not assign clear default 
entitlements. Despite this, however, using the work of the American economist John Umbeck as a basis, 
she argues that in the absence of any de jure allocation of default entitlements in any tradable 
commodity or economic asset, the actor with the greatest market influence will always necessarily de 
facto be able to stake ownership of that commodity or asset. In the context of personal data the actors 
with the greatest market share are of course information industry conglomerates such as Google.70  
In Purtova’s view, therefore, due to the European data protection framework not specifically specifying 
default entitlements in personal data, information industry actors have been able to take greater control 
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of individuals’ personal data, rendering them de facto owners. This conclusion is based on the findings 
that such actors are able to effectively deny individuals meaningful opportunities to avoid data 
collections71 and, due to the rivalrous nature of data-driven business models, have the ability to exclude 
their competitors from accessing any of the personal data harvested from their users.72 Significantly, 
whilst both Purtova and Victor evidently disagree about where the default entitlement to an individual’s 
personal data lies, they are both in firm agreement that the EU data protection framework constitutes a 
property regime in everything but name, and that so long as personal data maintain a high economic 
value the real question is not whether there are, or should be, property rights in personal data, but who 
those rights belong to. 
4.2.1.1 Dissecting the property rights arguments 
The suggestions that EU data protection law grants individuals proprietary interests in their personal 
data, such as those considered above, are not prima facie unreasonable, and the logic behind them is 
easy to follow. There are, however, several flaws to these arguments. 
Firstly, as noted above, the key distinguishing feature of property rights are the way in which they 
guarantee exclusivity to a resource. Victor’s argument that under the data protection framework 
individuals enjoy a default entitlement to their personal data, therefore, appears to be consistent with 
the notion of them being afforded proprietary interests in those data. However, the claim that individual 
data subjects have a default entitlement in their personal data is dubious. Whilst rules regarding consent 
and other data subject rights undoubtedly give individuals influence over their personal data even after 
those data are shared with other parties, from this it cannot be inferred that the individual in any way 
has the ultimate default entitlement in those data. The fact that, in some situations at least, the GDPR 
explicitly allows for the processing of personal data to be undertaken without the consent, or even the 
knowledge, of the data subject should alone be enough to dispel any suggestion that the data subject is 
the ultimate authority in respect of how their personal data are used by others.73 This is not to say that 
data subjects do not enjoy some authority in this respect, but evidently their entitlement is far from 
absolute.  
For similar reasons the second of Victor’s arguments can also be contested. Though the GDPR appears 
to treat personal data as a commodity that is, in effect, capable of changing hands and being traded, the 
fact that in so doing it appears to attach legal obligations to personal data themselves, rather than the 
individuals to whom those data relate, is not in itself enough to categorically demonstrate that the GDPR 
confers upon individuals proprietary interests in those data. Whilst rules that allow individuals to 
enforce rights against other parties, including those with whom they have not directly shared their 
personal data themselves, can certainly be considered “property-like”, when viewed in isolation they 
stop short of confirming that personal data can definitively be considered property. As noted in the 
previous paragraph, a key feature of property rights is the way in which they guarantee exclusivity to a 
resource. Whilst the rights conferred on individuals by the GDPR, such as the right to be forgotten and 
the right to data portability clearly provide individuals with a means of exerting influence over their 
personal data, the text of the GDPR explicitly makes it clear that the rights of the data subject will not 
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always necessarily prevail against other competing interests.74 The obvious implication of this is that 
whilst personal data certainly appear “property-like”, they cannot truly be considered property 
Another problem with suggestions that EU data protection law grants proprietary interests in personal 
data is that they are reliant on the notion that personal data can be considered a form of commodity, or 
are at least capable of commodification. Property rights, after all, stem from the ability of an individual 
to stake ownership of that commodity. In the context of personal data, this might not initially seem 
especially problematic. As has been noted elsewhere, for instance, the ability of a thing to change hands, 
or for it to be traded, is certainly suggestive of it being a commodified.75 Furthermore, it is widely 
accepted in the legal literature that notions of property should not be limited to physical items or goods, 
and should also encompass intangible property and things in action.76 As EU data protection law 
evidently allows for the transfer of personal data between parties, we might conclude personal data is 
certainly a commodity, and thus can be considered property-like.77 An individual might, for instance, 
choose to share certain aspects of their biographical data with a social networking site, or to share certain 
aspects of their medical data with a hospital or medical research organisation. The idea of personal data 
as a commodity fits well with both scenarios. In both instances the individual can segregate aspects of 
their personal data into defined categories and choose with which parties they wish for those data to be 
shared. This behaviour is certainly suggestive of a property-like regime. This idea, however, begins to 
break down when we consider the enormity of personal data as a concept. 
When considering whether it is possible to commodify an individual’s personal data for instance, we 
must remember that the jurisprudence of the CJEU has repeatedly stressed that the concept of personal 
data is to be treated expansively, and is not limited to information that can be used to obviously or 
directly identify an individual, such as an individual’s name, age, address, contact information and so 
on.78 Whilst it may be possible to easily commodify some aspects of an individual’s personal data, such 
as contact information, health data, financial data, other types of data are more difficult, or perhaps 
impossible, to effectively commodify. To take a mundane example, imagine Person A walks down a 
street on a Saturday morning and is seen by various other people. The information that Person A was 
seen on the street at this time clearly constitutes personal data for the purposes of data protection law. 
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Yet how could that information possibly be commodified and controlled, let alone owned? If we also 
stop to consider that personal data is non-rivalrous,79 and that certain types of data might potentially 
include information relating to two or more individuals,80 this issue becomes even more complicated.  
4.2.2 Arguments that EU data protection law grants personal interests in personal data 
Contra to the view that the data protection framework can be considered a regime which grants 
proprietary interests in personal data, others have argued that it instead offers individuals personality 
rights in respect of those data. In other words, it merely affords individuals rights by which they can 
control those data in certain circumstances. One proponent of such a view is van der Sloot, who, makes 
this argument based on an examination of ECtHR case law.81 Particularly, he argues that the authors of 
the ECHR originally intended that the purpose of the right to privacy, enshrined in Art.8 ECHR, to be 
a classic right, providing a negative right to individuals to be free from arbitrary interferences in their 
lives. Over time, however, the ECtHR has given a much broader interpretation, providing protection to 
matters relating to the development of the individual’s personality.82 Under this interpretation, 
individuals can claim positive freedoms and states may be held to actively facilitate said individuals in 
their quest to develop their personality. Accordingly, despite its origins, Art.8 ECHR has transformed 
into a personality right, the purpose of which, as noted above, is not only protect the individual from 
interference in their private lives but, inter alia, provide them with a positive freedom to control their 
personal information, engage in reputation management, and to develop their identity and personality. 
Using these observations about Art.8 ECHR as a starting point, van der Sloot goes on to suggest that 
similar observations can be made about the evolution of EU data protection law. Particularly, he notes 
that data protection, a concept which was devised specifically to address possible harms that may stem 
from large scale data processing activities, was originally intended to be a negative doctrine which 
focused predominantly on the duties of care of data processors. It is argued, however, that over the 
course of its existence it has transformed from a doctrine concerned with the liability of data processors 
into doctrine primarily concerned with protecting the personal interests of individuals, inter alia by 
granting them rights to control data, to object to certain types of processing, or to claim a right to erasure 
or data portability. This is a trend that can be seen in both legislative developments and the case law of 
the CJEU.83 Focusing on the possible harms that may stem from data processing operations linked to 
big data analytics, such as discriminatory consumer profiling,84 which may adversely affect the ability 
of individuals to manage their identities, he argues that the European data protection affords individuals 
the ability to control aspects of their personal data in certain circumstances where an absence of control 
may adversely affect the development of their personality or identity, but stops short of affording them 
proprietary interests in those data.  
Whilst the ability of the individual to exert influence and control over their personal data has 
undoubtedly increased over time, there is nothing, according to van der Sloot, in EU legislation or CJEU 
case law which indicates any control-related provisions are tantamount to the creation of any proprietary 
interests. Support for this general sentiment can also be found in the work of various other observers. 
Lynskey, for instance, noting that a key feature of the doctrine of property rights is that such rights are 
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alienable, and thus the rights holder has the ability to discard ownership of those rights should they 
wish, highlights that whilst the rules of the data protection framework allow an individual to effectively 
discard their personal data, and give free reign to other parties to use those data how they please, it 
would appear that they cannot discard their right to data protection itself.85 In other words, even if an 
individual’s personal data is alienable, under EU law the right to data protection itself, as contained 
within the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights is inalienable. Not only does this inalienability make the 
right to data protection incompatible with a fundamental tenet of the notion of property rights but, as 
the reason for this inalienability is linked to human dignity, a concept closely tied to the idea of 
individual personality. This of course, suggests that an individual’s data protection rights grant them 
personal rather than proprietary interests in their personal data.86 
4.2.2.1 Dissecting the personality rights arguments 
Much like the arguments which claim the EU data protection framework provides individuals with 
proprietary interests in their personal data, arguments which suggest in fact EU data protection law 
instead confers personality rights on individuals, such as those made by van der Sloot, are not prima 
facie unreasonable. Once again, however, there are several factors which suggest that whilst data 
protection rights can be considered “personality-like”, they cannot truly be considered personality rights 
in accordance with the orthodox understanding of the doctrine. There are two obvious reasons as to why 
this is the case.  
Firstly, as noted above, one key constituent element is the notion of personality rights is the fact that, 
as their name suggests, such rights are attached to an individual’s personality, and cannot exist 
independently of that personality.87 In other words, once the individual who holds such rights is no 
longer alive, the rights are taken to have extinguished upon their death. Interestingly, however, data 
protection rights cannot necessarily be described in this way. As has been argued by others, notably 
Harbinja, whilst the ECtHR has on several occasions stated that privacy is only a right enjoyed by the 
living,88 the same cannot necessarily be said for the right of data protection. As Harbinja points out, the 
national legislation of various EU Member states responsible for implementing the terms of the 
outgoing Data Protection Directive, notably that of Estonia and Bulgaria, grant various data protection 
rights which exist after death, and can be exercised by the heirs of the deceased.89 Moreover, her recent 
analysis of the GDPR also suggests that its substantive provisions appear to allow for some of the rights 
it confers on individuals to be, to some extent at least, exercisable after death, a concept she refers to as 
“post-mortem privacy”.90 This would imply that the rights enjoyed by individuals under the GDPR are 
incompatible with the orthodox understanding of the doctrine of personality rights. 
Secondly, also noted above, another key constituent feature of personality rights, is that their 
infringement tends to lead to non-pecuniary loss or damage that cannot be calculated in monetary terms. 
This ethos, however, appears to be at odds with the general spirit of the GDPR. As noted by Victor, for 
instance, the GDPR contains a system of remedies that are typically used to protect proprietary 
interests.91 Perhaps the most notable example of this is the way in which the GDPR introduces a bespoke 
                                                          
85 O Lynskey, (n.76) 240-241. 
86 Ibid., pp.242-244. See, also: K Eltis, 'Privacy: A Personality, Not Property, Right' (Freedom to Tinker, 
November 2016) <https://freedom-to-tinker.com/2016/11/07/privacy-a-personality-not-property-right/> 
accessed 13 April 2018;O Lynskey, (n.41)  
87 See above at 2.2 
88 See, for instance, the decisions in: Jäggi v Switzerland, no.58757/00, ECHR 2006-X; Estate of Kresten 
Filtenborg Mortensen v Denmark, no.1338/03, ECHR 2006-V; Koch v Germany, no.497/09, ECHR 19/07/2102. 
89 E Harbinja, 'Does the EU Data Protection Regime Protect Post-Mortem Privacy and What Could be the 
Potential Alternatives?' [2013] 10(1) SCRIPTed 26 
90 E Harbinja, 'Post-mortem privacy 2.0: theory, law and technology' [2017] 31(1) International Review of Law, 
Computers & Technology 26-42 
91 See above at 4.2.1 
right to compensation that can be invoked by data subjects in the event of them suffering material or 
non-material damage pursuant of a breach of the GDPR’s terms.92 In so doing, the GDPR appears to 
acknowledge, implicitly at least, that the harms that may stem from the errant processing of their 
personal data can potentially be pecuniary in nature, and that redress for those infringements can be 
measured in monetary terms.  
4.2.3 Discussion 
The above analyses of the debates regarding the European data protection framework bestows upon 
individual data subjects proprietary or personal interests in their personal data have revealed that whilst 
arguments made on both sides might appear initially attractive, there are several, possibly fundamental, 
doubts as to their cogency. It is undeniable that many of the characteristics of the data protection 
framework, for instance, render personal data either “property-like” or “personality-like”. However, 
simultaneously, there are a range of factors that appear to metaphorically torpedo and rule out any 
suggestion that they can categorically be considered either one or the other. In other words, the rights 
individuals enjoy under EU data protection law cannot be neatly categorised as either property rights 
nor personality rights, perhaps suggesting they in fact they belong to neither grouping.  
This leaves things in a rather troublesome position. As outlined at the beginning of this article, and 
reiterated throughout, in order for any right to be considered meaningful, it must be possible to identify 
with a degree of certainty what the precise nature of that right is. Quite clearly, however, the nature of 
the right to data protection, and those of the range of rights bestowed upon individuals by the data 
protection framework, are far from universally, or even consistently, understood. This is problematic, 
as this lack of certainty, by necessary implication, is suggestive of these rights having a low normative 
value. One conclusion that can immediately be drawn at this stage, therefore, is that not only is more 
research into their precise nature needed if their normative value is ever to be fully realised, but that 
this should be considered a matter of priority. However, whilst observers continue to debate whether 
the data protection framework treats personal data as property or as an aspect of one’s personality, there 
is perhaps another way of categorising these rights that has to date not been meaningfully explored. The 
remainder of this article is dedicated to an exploration of this “third way”, and the implications it may 
hold. 
5. Quasi-property rights 
Generally speaking, “quasi-property” is a term, most frequently found in the jurisprudence of courts in 
the USA rather than those of European legal systems. It is used to refer to situations in which the law 
seeks to simulate the idea of exclusion, normally associated with property rights, through a relational 
liability regime, by focusing on the nature and circumstances of interactions between parties which are 
thought to merit a highly circumscribed form of inclusion.  
As has been noted elsewhere, US equity courts began using the term “quasi-property” in the Nineteenth 
Century to describe legal interests that resembled property rights in their functioning even when they 
could not truly be considered property rights or, strictly speaking, ownership interests at all.93 A “lien” 
on the property of another, 94 an owner’s right to any improvements made to their realty,95 or a 
beneficial, as opposed to legal, interest in a property were all frequently termed by courts as interests 
that were of a quasi-proprietary nature.96 Since then, the term has more recently been used to refer to 
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an individual’s interest in relation to matters involving the desecration of a corpse,97 trademark 
dilution98 and the news.99 
In all these different areas of application it has been remarked that, though the subject matter of the 
quasi-property rights in question differ substantially between them, they all share important structural 
similarities. Common themes that can be identified between all of the above areas of application, for 
instance, include the way in which in relation to them all, the law has consistently avoided the creation, 
or recognition, of a genuine property right in the subject matter involved;  that despite this avoidance 
the law has evinces a belief that there is some value in the idea of imposing a limited duty of forbearance 
on that subject matter; and that this duty is heavily circumscribed by considerations that emanate 
directly from the actions, interactions and statuses of the parties involved, and only indirectly relate to 
the subject matter itself.100 
As noted above, the primary key function of a property right is the way in which it guarantees the right 
holder’s exclusive interest in the object or commodity that forms the subject matter of the right. In so 
doing, the right allows the rights holder to exclude others from accessing or using that subject matter. 
Such rights, therefore, operate on behalf of the rights holder against the world at large, regardless of 
any contextual peculiarities of their subject matter. Quasi-property rights, however, take a different, and 
more relaxed, approach. Specifically, quasi-property rights deemphasise the connection between the 
interest of the rights holder and the subject matter of the right, rendering the subject matter of the right 
itself devoid of objective exclusionary significance.  
Instead, quasi-property rights generate an exclusionary framework through a liability regime that 
focuses on interests that are implicated in the interactions between different parties, rather than 
emanating from the subject matter of the right.101 In other words, it is only through the interactions of 
relationships of the parties involved that the subject-matter of the right becomes endowed with 
exclusionary significance that resembles the functioning of property. From this description, it is possible 
to identify two interrelated analytical elements for quasi-property interests: a trigger for the 
exclusionary signal, and its communication to the actors to whom it applies.102 The exclusionary signal 
in the subject matter of a quasi-property right can be triggered by several factors, namely: the 
status/relationship of the involved parties, vis-à-vis one another; the unique environment or context in 
which they interact; the nature (wrongful or otherwise) of one party’s actions; or a combination of all 
three. 
So far as the status of the involved parties are concerned, surveys of relevant case law have suggested 
that the subject-matter of a purported quasi-property right will be endowed with a limited exclusionary 
significance in settings in which the objectives and relative positions of the parties taking an interest in 
that subject matter mandate that they pay greater attention to the manner in which they obtain and use 
that subject matter. In other words, the normative focus of the quasi-property rights regime is on the 
harms that may occur from the status of the parties (e.g. the parties might be competitors, and their 
dealings and interactions may lead to issues in respect of insider trading and/or unfair competition), 
rather than any harm that may come to the subject matter in abstract terms.103 So far as issues relating 
to the context in which the parties interact is concerned, it would seem that quasi-property interests 
most commonly arise in situations where the parties’ interactions are likely to have a detrimental effect 
on the wellbeing of one of the involved parties or that of another, rather than having a detrimental effect 
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on the purported quasi-property itself.104 The third set of situations in which quasi-property interests 
tend to arise involves the morally ambiguous behaviour of one of the interacting parties in relation to 
the purported quasi-property. Put simply, in situations where a party’s behaviour is morally ambiguous 
and directed at another party, but is affected or mediated an asset or commodity, this may also give rise 
to a quasi-property interest.105  
On the issue of communication, it can be remarked that the notion of quasi-property revolves around a 
directive that might best be described as “relational forbearance”. As noted by Balganesh: 
“Such a regime imposes (and communicates) a limited duty of forbearance on individuals when 
they acquire a particular status in relation to the interest holder, or when the context of their 
interaction or conduct necessitates limited exclusion. This duty of forbearance is only ever 
imposed relationally, by reference to the interest-holder rather than the object of the interest. 
Individuals are directed by the law to avoid interfering with the object of the interest under a 
particular set of circumstances, defined with a good measure of specificity.”106 
In so doing, the law moves away from the subject matter of the purported right and towards the 
relationship of the holder of the interest and the interfering party. As a result, the normative basis moves 
away from the boundaries of the subject matter of the interest, and towards the circumstances 
necessitating exclusion. In other words, the exclusionary interests conferred by quasi-property rights 
not only arise as a result of the relationship between the parties involved, but their character and scope 
will depend on the nature of the relationship between the involved parties. 
5.1 Viewing data protection rights through a quasi-property lens 
As outlined previously, the key functions of quasi-property rights can be described as follows. They are 
rights that grant an individual a limited exclusionary interest in a commodity which allows that 
individual to exclude others from accessing or using that asset or commodity in a limited number of 
circumstances depending on the interests of the rights holder that are affected but stops short of 
affording them a complete and unfettered property right in that commodity. These rights will typically 
arise as a result of particular features relating to the relationships between affected parties, the context 
in which the parties interact, and the nature of their interactions. What is significant for the purposes of 
this article is that for several reasons these key constituent features of quasi-property rights appear to 
closely resemble the rights EU citizens enjoy under the data protection framework in respect of their 
personal data.107  
Firstly, as was touched upon above, the substantive tenets of the European data protection framework 
evidently do not confer upon individual data subjects a total and unfettered sovereignty in respect of 
their personal data. This is made abundantly clear by the way in which the GDPR lists multiple bases 
through which the processing of an individual’s personal data can be legitimised, the majority of which 
require no input or authorisation of the individual to be successfully invoked.108 Furthermore, the GDPR 
also lists a number of exceptions, where the personal data of an individual can be processed without 
engaging its substantive provisions at all.109 The rights individuals’ enjoy in respect of their personal 
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data under the GDPR are also, in many cases, subject to limitations.110 That said, there is no doubt that 
whilst these limitations exist and data subject rights are not absolute, the GDPR affords individuals a 
range of ways in which they can attempt to control and exert influence over their personal data. As also 
noted above, the text of the GDPR also envisages personal data as a commodity that is capable of 
changing hands. As touched upon in this section of the article, legal rules which allow individuals to 
enjoy some limited, but not absolute control and/or exclusivity, over an asset or commodity are 
hallmarks of a quasi-property regime. 
Secondly, the fact that quasi-property rights arise because of the interactions between the purported 
rights holder and the alleged interferer in those rights is also significant due to further parallels that can 
be drawn between this position and the rights of individuals under the data protection framework. As 
mentioned in the previous paragraph, under the GDPR individuals enjoy a range of rights in respect of 
their personal data. Many of these rights, however, can only be exercised against parties that are can be 
identified as “data controllers”.111 The effective exercise of these rights, therefore, is dependent on the 
existence of a data subject/data controller relationship. If such a relationship does not exist, these rights 
cannot be exercised. The fact that the exercise of these rights, appears to depend entirely on the existence 
of a relationship between the data subject and the data controller therefore, is inherently quasi-property-
like.  
Thirdly, the fact that the scope of a quasi-property right will depend on the nature of the relationship 
between the parties involved in the subject matter of that right is also noteworthy. As noted above, the 
obligations imposed on a party against whom such a right is enforced will depend on the nature of that 
party’s relationship with the rights holder, and there will be limits to the extent to which the former can 
be bound. In other words, the bound party’s liability will be qualified depending on the nature of their 
relationship with the rights holder. Once again, is reminiscent of the situation under the European data 
protection framework. The primary relationship in the context of data protection law is that of data 
subject and data controller. Data controllers have obligations regarding the use of individuals’ personal 
data imposed on them by data protection law precisely because of the nature of their relationship with 
data subjects (i.e. because they are data controllers). These obligations, however, are not absolute. They 
do not, for instance, completely proscribe the use, collection or sharing of personal data. Data controllers 
are free to utilise personal data in any way they wish so long as it does not infringe one of EU data 
protection law’s substantive provisions. When viewed this way, we can see the scope and existence of 
a data controller’s obligations under EU data protection law are dependant and qualified upon the 
controller’s relationships with data subjects. 
Finally, the fact that quasi-property interests most commonly arise in situations where the parties’ 
interactions are likely to have a detrimental effect on the wellbeing of one of the involved parties or that 
of another, rather than a detrimental effect to the purported quasi-property itself, can also be pointed to 
as a noteworthy point of comparison. This feature of quasi-property rights, for instance, seems to 
correlate resoundingly with one of the primary rationales for the inception of data protection law in 
Europe. Whilst the data protection framework has over time evolved and morphed into a state where 
the concept of personal data is now treated as a tradeable commodity in everything but name, we must 
remember that one of the main motivations for the inception of data protection as a body of law was to 
protect individuals from events capable of harming their wellbeing that were thought to stem from their 
relationships with private and public-sector organisations. This is something that has been widely 
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acknowledged in the privacy and data protection literature.112 Put simply, the existence of both data 
protection rights and quasi-property rights are routed, at least partially, in extremely similar foundations.  
6. Conclusion 
This article opened by considering how for the true and precise meaning of an assertion of any right to 
be fully appreciated it is important to be able to state with some certainty how that right is constructed 
and precisely what that right purports to do. As also noted above, if it is not possible to make these 
determinations in respect of a right any analyses of that right will inevitably be imprecise. This will 
unavoidably generate confusion and raise questions as to the normative value of that right.  
Property rights and personality rights were then discussed, and it was explained how they could be 
categorised as rights as per the now widely accepted Hohfeldian methodology. Following this, the right 
to data protection as enshrined in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union was 
discussed. Whilst it can be convincingly argued that despite some overlap with the right to privacy, the 
right to date protection can be delineated and considered a free-standing right, considerable doubts 
persist as to whether data protection rights can, or should, be conceptualised as property rights or 
personality rights. 
Evidently, there is now significant disagreement in the scholarly literature as to whether European data 
protection law can be said to grant individuals ownership of their personal data, or if instead it allows 
individuals to exercise control of those data in certain situations as a means of managing aspects of their 
identity and personality. Not only does the debate between these two positions cause difficulties in 
terms of clarity of legal analyses, but it also raises questions about the normative value of the right to 
data protection. Until this debate is resolved, the existence of the right to data protection is arguably 
somewhat parlous. There is, therefore, evidently a need, and ample room, to investigate this issue in 
greater detail.  
As a means of furthering this debate, the article introduced the notion of quasi-property rights, habitually 
a creature of US jurisprudence, and considered whether the rights conferred on data subjects under EU 
data protection law could be categorised as such. The results of the above analyses suggest that there 
are in fact several consistent themes and similarities between data protection rights and rights which 
grant quasi-proprietary interests. The upshot of this is that it seems possible, or even plausible, that EU 
data protection rights are neither proprietary nor personal in nature, and that there are perhaps additional 
dimensions to the ongoing property vs personality debate that are yet to be fully explored.  
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